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1. Introduction 
Since the Labour party announced plans to bring the water companies and the electricity and gas transmission and 
distribution companies, and Royal Mail, into public ownership, there have been claims by the CBI, the Social Market 
Foundation (SMF) and others about: 
- The cost of compensation 
- the impact this would have on pension funds or employees which own shares in these companies, and   
- the risk of claims by foreign owners under international treaties, e.g. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).    
 
This paper on pension funds and employees is the second of three reports by PSIRU addressing these issues. 
 
2. Pensioners and employees 
 
This paper presents some results of a comprehensive analysis of the ownership of water and energy grid companies 
in the UK as at July 2019.  This analysis identified all major shareholders of these companies, both listed and non-
listed; identifies every investor owning more than 1% of each sector; and calculates what proportion of these 
companies, and each sector as a whole, is actually owned by five categories of investor: UK pension funds (UK PFs) ; 
other pension funds (other PFs); employees; sovereign wealth funds (SWFs); and investors eligible to claim under 
international agreements, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs).   
 
The key results in respect of UK pension funds and employees are as follows: 
 
• UK pension funds own about 8.5% of the water sector and about 2% of the energy grid sector: just over 5% 
across both sectors.  So 95% of these companies are owned by investors who are not UK pension funds.  
 
• the estimated difference between compensation based on book value and a realistic estimate of market 
value would affect the value of UK pension fund investments by less than 0.1% - less than the normal daily 
fluctuation in the value of investments, and effectively ‘invisible’.  This difference would have no impact on 
the value of actual pensions paid. 
 
• About 0.1% of all water companies and 0.1% of all energy grid companies is held by employees. Legal advice 
in a recent case says that income from a buyout of employee shares must be treated for taxation purposes 
as a benefit from employment, so compensation for employees who own shares can and must be treated 
differently from the investors who own the other 99.9%. 
• Variation in compensation paid to shareholders would thus have negligible impact on either employees of 
water and energy companies or members of funded pension schemes some of whose holdings include some 
water or energy shares. 
 
Table A. Pension fund and employee ownership of water and energy grids (direct + via shares) 
% of sector owned by investors who are: UK pension 
funds 
Employees Foreign 
pension 
funds 
Water 8.5% 0.1% 17.0% 
Energy grids: electricity and gas, transmission and distribution) 2.0% 0.1% 7.2% 
TOTAL (Water and energy grids) 5.2% 0.1% 12.1% 
Sources: see annexes  
 
These results contrast sharply with the assumptions made by commentators without hard information on actual 
ownership.  The CBI for example talks about impact on ‘pensioners’, but nowhere offers any data on pension funds’ 
ownership. Instead it claims that failure to increase compensation by an arbitrary 30% means that £9billion could be 
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lost to ‘UK savers and pensioners’, based solely on the assumption that ‘20% of the shares are held by UK investors’1.   
The implications of these claims are strange: on their own figures, foreign investors will get four times as much 
benefit than the UK investors, £36billion compared with £9billion, so higher compensation is a very bad way of trying 
to help UK investors; especially as all the extra £45billion compensation they seek would be paid by UK citizens, who 
will thus in net terms lose £36billion while the overseas investors would gain the same amount.  
 
A. Pension funds ownership  
 
 Water 
There are three water companies owned by groups listed on the London Stock Exchange, which between them 
account for just over a third, by value, of all the water companies: Pennon, Severn Trent, and United Utilities.  UK PFs 
own 3.2% of Pennon, 2.2% of SVT (and an estimated 3.2% of UU). The ownership of these shares of the three listed 
companies amounts in total to about 1% of the sector. The shares of listed companies held by foreign PFs are slightly 
greater, at about 1.6% of the sector.  These and other figures for ownership of listed companies include ‘beneficial’ 
ownership through shares which are nominally held by investor groups.  With regard to direct ownership of non-
listed companies – about two-thirds of the sector - UK pension funds hold 7.6% of the sector, while overseas pension 
funds, principally from Canada and Australia, own twice as much in direct holdings, a total of over 15.6% of the 
sector by value.  The combined totals thus show that UK pension funds own about 8.5% of the sector, foreign PFs 
own about 17.0%.   
 
Table B. Water: pension funds shareholdings as % by value (RCV) of all water cos 
WATER    
 
Shares in listed (PNN, 
SVT, UU) as % of all 
energy grid companies 
Direct holdings as % of all 
energy grid companies TOTAL 
UK PFs 1.0% 7.6% 8.5% 
Other PFs 1.5% 15.6% 17.0% 
Source: see annexes 
 
 Energy grids 
UK listed groups own a higher proportion of the energy grids than in water, with 32% by value owned by National 
Grid and 11% by SSE. About 1.8% of National Grid shares, and about 2.1 % of SSE shares, are owned by UK PFs, about 
0.8% of the sector in total.  Larger proportions of the UK listed companies are owned by foreign PFs, (7.3% of NG and 
4.9% of SSE), and these shareholdings account for nearly 3% of the energy grid sector as a whole.  There is only one 
significant investment by a UK pension fund in a non-listed energy grid company, worth 1.2% of the sector as a 
whole, while foreign pension funds’ direct holdings amount to over 4% of the sector, mainly due to two Canadian 
funds holding 25% each of the Scottish and Southern gas distribution networks.  Combining the direct holdings with 
the holdings in the listed companies, UK PFs own 2.0% of the energy grid companies, and foreign PFs just over 7%. 
 
Table C. Energy grids: pension fund shareholders as % of total RAV of all energy grid cos 
ENERGY    
 
Direct holdings as % of 
all energy grid 
companies 
Shares in listed companies 
(NG/SSE) as % of all energy 
grid companies TOTAL 
UK PFs 1.2% 0.8% 2.0% 
Other PFs 4.3% 2.9% 7.2% 
Source: see annexes 
 
 
1 CBI 2019 Renationalisation: the cost p.2    This is simply copied from the sameassumption made by Nera consulting in a 
paper commissioned by the water companies – neither has any information on the actual involvement of pension funds. Nera 
2018 The impact of nationalisation  of utilities on UK households’ savings and pensions https://www.pennon-
group.co.uk/sites/default/files/attachments/pdf/180605-nationalisation-savings-nera.pdf 
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As shown in Table A, above, the combined result across both water and energy is that UK PFs own about 5.2% of the 
combined sectors, while foreign PFs own just over 12%.  The results for the listed companies alone, which show UK 
PFs owning variously 1.8%, 2.1%, 2.2% and 3.2% are broadly in line with the ONS finding that UK pension funds 
generally own about 3% of UK listed companies.2 
 
 Impact of compensation calculations on UK pension funds 
 
There is no set formula under English law for compensation to former private shareholders of companies which are  
nationalised, rather the compensation has to be laid down in each case by parliament in the relevant nationalisation 
law.i  and two approaches which have been most discussed have been the possible use of book value of equity (aka 
‘net assets’) as a starting point, compared with a credible estimate of ‘market value’, as indicated by the share price 
of companies listed on a stock exchange. 3 ii  The choice of method will affect the result for taxpayers on the one 
hand, and investors on the other hand, 
 
Paying compensation based on will normally be lower than ‘market value’ as indicated by the share price of 
companies listed on a stock exchange, and so the difference between these two figures may be used indicate the 
significance for tax payers, on the one hand, and investors on the other – including pension funds (although 
companies which are not as profitable as expected may have a market value less than book value of equity, as is the 
case with Royal Mail plc in October 2019). 
 
In the water sector, compensation based on book value/net assets  would be £14.5billion; compensation based on 
market value as at end May 2019 could be £34.4billion4 so the difference would be about £20billion in total for all 
owners of the sector. Of this 8.3% of which would fall on UK pension funds, representing less than 0.8% of fund 
assets.  For the energy grids, the gap is similar: estimated market value of about £37.7bn, vs net assets of £17bn5, 
but only 2.0% of this falls on UK pension funds, representing less than 0.02% of total assets.  
 
The combined impact for both sectors of the entire difference between compensation based on full current market 
value, and compensation based on book value of equity (or net assets) is thus less than 0.1% of pension fund assets.  
That is of the same order as daily fluctuations in share prices of the listed companies, and can be fairly described as 
‘invisible’ amidst the numerous factors affecting share values.  
 
Such fluctuations in the  value of publicly quoted shares  occur from time to time and are part of the risk involved in 
stock market investments: funds are invested in a diversity of shares to diversify this risk, precisely so that the 
impact of any single factor is minimised. For the 50% of occupational pensioners whose pension is dependent on 
‘defined benefit’ schemes, such factors do not by definition affect their pensions; the minimisation of the impact of 
individual share valuation ('invisibility') resulting from diversification of asset classes and individual holdings (risk-
spreading) means that no actuarial adjustment should (would) result to contributions by current scheme members. 
The impact on the personal pension ‘pots’ of the 50% of occupational pensioners who are in ‘defined contribution’ 
schemes is, similarly, minimal on total portfolios.  
 
Table D. Potential impact of difference in compensation on pension funds and pensions 
 UK PF Assets (£ 
billions) OECD 2018 
UK PF Holdings in water and 
energy grids as % of total UK PF 
investments 
Potential Diff in compensation 
between book value vs ‘market 
value’falling on UK PFs as % of UK PF 
Assets  
Total £2,200 billion 0.17% 0.1% 
Sources: company annual reports 2018; OFGEM 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2019/03/supporting_data_file_to_regulatory_financial_performance_annex_to_r
iio-1_annual_reports_-_2017-18.xlsx ; OECD https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/private-pensions/Pension-Funds-in-Figures-
2018.pdf; PSIRU calculations. Market value of investments estimated from listed companies and relative RCVs/RAVs 
 
2 ONS Ownership of UK Quoted Shares: 2014 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshares/2015-09-02   
3 or RCV-net debt 
4 the SMF claim of £44bn noted in the FT is simply generated by arbitrarily adding 30% to the market value as estimated above.  
5 Based on RAV-net debt 
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B. Employee shares  
Employee shareholdings have been identified in the formal shareholder lists of three of the five listed water and 
energy companies – Pennon, Severn Trent and SSE. In both cases these represent less than 1% of the company’s 
shares. These employee shares are estimated to represent about 0.1% of both the water and energy sectors. No 
major employee shareholders were noted in any non-listed companies.  So again, 99.9% of the benefit of increasing 
compensation would go to all the international private equity funds and banks – a very inefficient way of protecting 
employee interests. 
Table A.  Employee shareholdings in listed water and energy companies  
 
      
as % of water 
sector  (Pennon+ 
SVT + UU) 
as % of energy 
grid sector  
(NG+SSE)) 
 Pennon SVT UU NG SSE   
Employees 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.9% 0.1% 0.1% 
Source: see annexes 
 
 Impact of compensation calculation on employees 
In any case, the government has to treat employees differently from other investments, as an employment benefit. 
The WOC Portsmouth Water was 73% owned by an employee trust until Feb 2018 when the trust, and the other 
shareholders, agreed to sell to the private equity investor Ancala.  This sale led to legal and tax advice from lawyers 
and HMRC that the money paid to employees for their shares should be treated as income from employment, and 
not only taxed but also subject to N.I. contributions. So the government can and must treat employee-owned shares 
differently from those of other investors, and compensate them for the full value of their shares by negotiating 
improvements in pay and conditions, without giving rise to claims for comparable treatment by other investors.  
 
The Portsmouth Water annual report for 2018 states:   
“As a result of this transaction, share options relating to the 73% EBT shareholding were issued to the trust 
beneficiaries at market value (the majority of current employees and certain former employees). These 
options were exercised immediately and the shares disposed of as part of the transaction. External tax 
advice and HMRC clearance indicated that the sales proceeds due to employees, were deemed to have 
arisen “by virtue of their employment” by the Group. As such these distributions were subject to PAYE and 
NI contributions. In order to tax effect these sale proceeds due to employees the gross consideration 
received was paid to the Company and processed through payroll with payments being made net to 
employees. As such, additional employee PAYE and NIC contributions were settled out of the gross proceeds 
and were paid during April 2018.” Portsmouth Water AR 2018 p.39 and p.76 note 31 
https://www.portsmouthwater.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/REPORT-ACCOUNTS-2018.pdf 
 
C. Conclusion 
There are at least five fundamental flaws in the idea that pensioners or employees will suffer in some way from 
lower compensation.  
 
1. Since the case for higher compensation is based on a myth that there is some objective formula for ‘true 
market value’, for which the CBI and SMF use a long discredited figure, the payment of compensation based 
on real net asset value cannot be treated as a ‘loss’. The larger figure is larger, but it’s just an arbitrary big 
claim by investors.  
2. Only about 5% of shareholders in the water and energy sectors are UK pension funds (8.5% of the water 
sector, and 2% of the energy grids sector). That means that 95% of the benefit from more generous 
compensation would go to international investors, private equity funds, and banks. There are much better 
ways of supporting UK pensioners  - for example, the water companies could reverse their policies of closing 
their own pension schemes and running big deficits in their pension funds.   
3. Variations in the market value of investments are entirely normal. The value of shares and bonds varies on a 
daily and hourly basis for multiple reasons, so pension funds are invested in a wide variety of shares and 
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debt, in order to minimise the impact of these risks by spreading them. There are many types of risk – from 
general economic recession, to incompetent management, fall in demand for a product or service – 
including the risk of changes of government policy as a result of elections or other factors, which is known as 
political risk. Funds are invested in a diversity of shares to diversify exposure to all these risks, precisely so 
that the impact of any single factor is minimised.  
4. The same applies when funds value individual investments. If a fund invests in oil companies, for example, 
fund managers will take account of the risk their business will suffer because of decarbonisation policies, as 
well as other factors.  When funds invest in companies which are not listed on a stock exchange, they have 
to use various methods to estimate their value (though they would never do what the CBI and SMF do, and 
base this on ‘enterprise value’). Sometimes these assessments will turn out to be correct, sometimes not, 
but it is not for the government, on behalf of taxpayers, to compensate funds for such mistakes.  
5. The impact on funds of such a factor is tiny in relation to the investments of each fund as a whole. Even if 
investors in UK water and energy grids were, in total, notionally ‘losing’ £40bn short of ‘true market value’, 
the 5% of that ‘loss’ for UK pension funds would total just over £2billion. But this represents less than 0.1% 
of the £2200billion investments by UK pension funds – much less than the average daily fluctuation in the 
price of investments. The impact would be invisible. 
6. The impact on actual pensions is thus minimal. For the 50% of occupational pensioners whose pension is 
dependent on ‘defined benefit’ schemes, such factors do not by definition affect their pensions; and the 
'invisibility' resulting from diversification of asset classes and individual holdings means that no actuarial 
adjustment would result to contributions by current scheme members. The impact on the personal pension 
‘pots’ of the 50% of occupational pensioners who are in ‘defined contribution’ schemes is minimal on total 
portfolios for the same reason – and because the variation only amounts to less than 0.1% of PF 
investments. 
7.  Employee shareholdings are very small, and are legally treated as employee benefits, so however they are 
compensated must be different from the bulk of other investors. 
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Annexe 1 : Companies to be taken into public ownership under plans announced by Labour party 
 
Water: 
Anglian Water Services Limited 
Northumbrian Water Limited  
Severn Trent Water Limited  
Southern Water Services Limited  
South West Water Limited  
Thames Water Utilities Limited  
United Utilities Water Limited  
Wessex Water Services Limited  
Yorkshire Water Services Limited  
Affinity Water Limited  
Bristol Water plc  
Portsmouth Water Limited  
South East Water Limited  
South Staffordshire Water plc  
Sutton and East Surrey Water plc 
 
Energy: 
National Grid Gas Plc 
National Grid Electricity Transmission Plc 
Scottish Hydro Electric Transmission Plc 
SP Transmission Plc 
Cadent Gas 
Scotland Gas Networks 
Southern Gas Networks 
Wales & West 
Electricity North West Limited 
Eastern Power Networks Plc 
London Power Networks Plc 
South Eastern Power Networks Plc 
Northern Powergrid (Northeast) Limited 
Northern Powergrid (Yorkshire) Plc 
Scottish Hydro Electric Power Distribution Plc 
Southern Electric Power Distribution Plc 
SP Distribution Plc 
SP Manweb Plc 
Western Power Distribution (East Midlands) Plc 
Western Power Distribution (South Wales) Plc 
Western Power Distribution (South West) Plc 
Western Power Distribution (West Midlands) Plc 
 
  
University of Greenwich CREW Public Services International Research Unit  www.gre.ac.uk 
8 
 
Annexe 2: Methodology 
 
The companies examined consist of all those identified for public ownership by the Labour party as at May 2019: 
- The water and sewerage companies, and water only companies, licensed by OFWAT 
- The electricity and gas transmission and distribution companies licensed by OFGEM 
 
In water, the data on ownership was taken from the latest (2018) annual reports for each company as lodged at 
Companies House, checked against more recent news reports, and the data in Corporate Watch’s December 2018 
report.  In energy, the ownership of the companies was taken from the latest (2018) annual reports for each 
company as lodged at Companies House, checked against news reports.  The data on book value of equity was taken 
from company annual reports in all cases. 
 
Market capitalisation values are not available for any of the operating companies, as none of them are listed on a 
stock exchange.  In water, 3 groups listed on the London stock exchange own 3 of the main water and sewerage 
companies (WASCs) ; in energy, 2 groups listed on the LSE, and one Spanish group listed on the MCE, own a number 
of transmission and distribution grid companies.  Since the current proposals for public ownership do not involve 
buying the entire listed companies, but only the specific UK gas and electricity grid companies owned by them, the 
market value of the listed companies with businesses other than water or UK energy grids was reduced pro rata to 
the importance of the water or energy grid businesses to the listed company as a whole, as presented in the 
companies’ segmental analyses: e.g. these represent 44% of the profits of NG, and 42% of SSE. 
(https://investors.nationalgrid.com/~/media/Files/N/National-Grid-IR-V2/reports/2017-18/annual-report-and-
accounts.pdf ,   https://sse.com/media/522419/sse-28225-ar2018-web-03-july-2018.pdf ). In order to assess the 
proportion of the overall ownership of the industry held by different investors, it was assumed that the relative 
‘value’ of the companies is reflected in the relative values of the RCV/RCAs fixed by the regulators – not, it should be 
emphasised, the actual value. The ‘market value’ of those companies owned by listed groups was then used as a 
base to estimate a notional ‘market value’ for the sector.  
 
The beneficial ownership of shares in 4 of the 5 companies listed on the LSE (Pennon, Severn Trent, National Grid, 
and SSE) was taken from Jan 2017 data on all shareholdings above 0.01%. In producing overall estimates of the 
shareholdings in listed companies, it was assumed that United Utilities data would be equivalent to the larger of 
either Pennon or SVT.  For each non-listed company the percentage of shares held by individual investors was 
identified using company reports, media reports, and checked against CW Jan 2019 data. These holdings were then  
converted into an estimate of the proportion of the industry, by applying the proportion of sectoral RCV held by 
company. Thus Cheung Kong’s 100% ownership of Northumbrian water counts as 6.2% of the sector, as 
Northumbrian’s RCV is 6.2% of the total value of the RCV for the entire sector; Hermes 8.7% holding in Thames 
Water is equivalent to 1.8% of the sector, as Thames has 20% of the total RCV , while Hermes also holds 21% of 
Southern, which is equivalent to about 1.5% of the sector, as Southern represents 7.3% of RCV.   
 
Each investor was classified as a pension fund (PF), a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) or other; and their home country 
was identified. This enabled ownership to be analysed both by type of investor and country of owner, and generate 
overall estimates as well as individual holdings as a proportion of the sector 
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Annexe 3:  Ownership of English water companies and UK energy grid companies  
 
Table G shows all the major investors who own more than 1% of the water sector.  This includes all the investors in the non-listed groups who own 65% of the water 
companies, as well as shares in the three listed groups shown  above.  This has been colour coded to show separately the 3 listed companies (pink), UK and foreign pension 
funds (dark and light green) and Asian and Middle Eastern investors (blue). This table shows that most investments by UK and foreign PFs, and by Asian investors,  consists 
of holdings in non-listed groups, as shown in Table B above.  
 
For non-UK pension funds, Table G shows that holdings by Canadian and Australian pension funds account for 20.6% of the English water companies, mainly in Thames and 
Anglian. There are additionally other much smaller holdings in the listed companies by other non-UK pension funds, including from the Netherlands, Sweden, state-level 
USA pension funds, Japanese national pension fund.   
 
Apart from the listed companies and the UK and foreign pension funds, there are a number of Asian investors, led by Cheung Kong Infrastructure (Hong Kong) and YTL 
(Malaysia), and some sovereign wealth funds, who have holdings of over 1% of the sector. It should be noted that some of the sovereign wealth funds could also be 
categorised as pension funds.  
 
Only one of the WOCs appears in the table, South East Water, as none of the others is large enough to feature holdings worth close to 1% of the sector or more.  
 
These results are broadly in line with the findings of the Corporate Watch December 2018 report on the water sector https://corporatewatch.org/who-owns-your-water-
and-how-theyll-try-to-keep-it/ .  
 
Table B. Largest owners of English water companies 
 
Water companies    
Holding  
as % of 
total  
RCV Anglian 
North-
umbria
n  
Severn 
Trent  
Souther
n 
South 
West Thames 
United 
Utilities Wessex 
Yorkshir
e 
South 
East 
Water 
Water co % of total RCV    100.0% 11.5% 6.2% 13.0% 7.3% 5.1% 20.4% 16.4% 4.6% 9.6% 1.9% 
Groups/investors Type  Country            
United Utilities Listed  ES 16.4%       100.0%    
Severn Trent Listed  UK 13.0%   100.0%        
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Listed  HK 6.9%  100.0%  9.5%       
OMERS/ Borealis PF  CAN 6.5%           31.8%        
Pennon Group Listed  UK 5.1%     100.0%      
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YTL PE  MY 4.6%        100.0%   
Canada Pension Plan PF  CAN 3.8% 32.9%                  
First State Investments PE  JP 3.7% 32.3%          
Hermes Investment Management  PF  UK 3.3%    21.0%  8.7%     
GIC (SI) SWF  SG 3.2%         33.6%  
Corsair Capital PE  USA 2.9%         30.3%  
JP Morgan Asset Mangt PE  USA 2.9%    39.8%       
University Superannuation Scheme 
(USS) PF  UK 2.3%      11.0%     
Commonwealth Bank of Australia   PF  AU 2.3% 19.8%                  
Deutsche Asset Management  PE  DE 2.2%         23.4%  
Infinity (ADIA, Abu Dhabi) SWF  UE 2.0%      9.9%     
Wren House (KIA) SWF  KW 1.8%      8.8%     
CIC Capital  SWF  CN 1.8%      8.7%     
BC IMC  PF  CAN 1.8%           8.7%        
UBS Asset Management PE  CH 1.6%    21.9%       
SAS Trustee Corp  PF  AU 1.2%                 12.8%  
QIC PE  AU 1.1%      5.4%     
Fiera Infrastructure PE  CAN 1.0%      5.0%     
UTA International PE  AU 1.0%           
RBS Pension Fund PF  UK 1.0%          50% 
GLIL group of LGPFs PF  UK 0.9% 11%          
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Table H shows the largest individual shareholders in the energy grids sector by value, including the 43% owned by National Grid and SSE.  Unlike water, there is only one 
direct holding by a UK pension fund in a non-listed energy grid company – Hermes’ 8.5% stake in Cadent Gas.   As a result, the proportion of the energy sector owned by UK 
pension funds is smaller than in water.   
As in water, Cheung Kong Infrastructure has a significant presence, owning 15.1% of the sector, with a further 6% owned by other Asian and Middle Eastern investors. But 
25% of the sector is owned by three European and USA companies – Iberdrola, PPL, and Berkshire Hathaway (Warren Buffet’s investment vehicle). 
 
Table C. Largest owners of UK energy grid companies  
 
    GT ET ET ET GD GD GD GD ED ED ED ED ED ED 
   
Compa
ny 
Nat 
Grid 
Gas 
Nat 
Grid 
Elec 
Scottis
h 
Hydro 
ET 
SP 
Trams
mission 
Cadent 
Gas NGN SGN 
Wales 
& West NWEN 
UK 
Power 
Networ
ks 
N 
Powerg
rid SSEN SPEN WPD 
Owners Type Country 
%of all 
grids 
RAV 8.3% 18.4% 3.0% 3.0% 13.6% 3.1% 7.9% 3.1% 2.8% 9.3% 4.9% 5.4% 5.7% 11.6% 
National Grid plc Listed UK 32.0% 100% 100%     39.0%                   
Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure PE HK 15.1%           88.4%   100%   100%         
PPL Corp PE USA 11.6%              100% 
SSE Listed UK 11.0%     100%       33.0%         100%     
Iberdrola PE ES 8.7%    100%         100%  
Berkshire Hathaway PE USA 4.9%           100%    
First State 
Investments PE JP 2.8%         100%      
OTPP [Ontario 
Teachers Pension 
Plan] PF CAN 2.0%             25.0%               
OMERS/ Borealis PF CAN 2.0%             25.0%               
Macquarie 
Infrastructure and 
Real Assets PE AU 2.0%     14.5%          
CIC Capital [China 
Investment 
Corporation] SWF CN 1.4%         10.5%                   
Allianz Capital 
Partners PE UK 1.4%     10.2%          
Abu Dhabi 
Investment Authority SWF AE 1.3%             16.7%               
Hermes Investment 
Management  PF UK 1.2%         8.5%                   
Qatar Investment 
Authority SWF QA 1.2%         8.5%                  
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i See paper I in this series for a longer discussion of the legal framework. 
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